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Introduction 
In September 2007, the European Commission published a Communication on “Public-Private 
Dialogue in Security Research and Innovation” (European Commission, 2007a). The outcome 
of a joint venture between DG Enterprise and Industry and DG Justice, Freedom and Security 
(DG JLS), it sought to specify the guidelines, objectives and modalities for the relations 
between public and private actors in EU-funded security research schemes, in the context of 
introducing a ‘Security’ theme within the Community’s 7
th Framework Programme (FP7).  
The tabling of this Communication, however, is misleading. Indeed, relations between the 
European institutions, particularly the European Commission, and major companies in the field 
of defence and security, have intensified significantly since the early 2000s. Starting with the 
establishment of the Group of Personalities on Security Research (GoP) in 2003 and the launch 
of the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) in 2004, it seems that these relations 
have in fact already moved beyond a mere ‘dialogue’. Major defence and security companies 
have played a key role in the definition of the orientation and priorities of the EU’s research and 
development policy for security-related technical systems – and also turn out to be the major 
beneficiaries of this policy. 
This observation leaves unanswered a series of questions concerning the ‘dialogue’ advocated 
by the European Commission. Firstly, between whom is this dialogue supposed to take place? 
Previous and current EU security research schemes have notoriously left little room for 
participants other than major industrial groups, on the one hand, and national and European 
security agencies and services, on the other. Secondly, what should be the purpose of such a 
dialogue? So far, the objectives of EU security research schemes remain vague and their 
priorities undefined. They include enhancing the protection of EU citizens in the face of “new 
threats”, the preservation of “European values” as well as sustaining the “European industrial 
base”. In the meantime, a serious assessment - which would go beyond a mere cataloguing - of 
the priorities that need to take precedence (including in financial terms), and of the ‘threats’ that 
are not a priority is still lacking. The analysis of insecurities, their diversity, their inevitability in 
an open world, is never properly carried out. In the process, the fact that insecurity also means 
opportunity and freedom, which would counterbalance the ideology of a security for all by 
showing it to be an untenable argument, is put aside. Technology is embraced as an 
unquestionable component of the EU’s security policies. It is presented as a solution not only 
for one given threat, but for many, if not all of them. This perspective sustains a tendency to 
adopt as the best technology the one that is purported to be the most multi-functional, capable of 
simultaneously confronting several threats – technical systems are ‘added’ onto one another, 
such as in the case of biometrics, computerised databases and speedy exchange of information 
when confronting the difficulties posed at the transnational level by any form of freedom of 
circulation (except, for a while at least, the circulation of capital). This lack of reflection upon 
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the effects and implications of current and future technical systems, beyond discussions of their 
‘capabilities’ or ‘efficiency’, is all the more problematic as civil liberties and privacy 
organisations, but also European and national agencies in charge of these questions have at best 
been marginalised as ‘end-users’, or worse, completely excluded from EU security research 
schemes. 
The present briefing note provides a brief overview in section 1 of the relations between the EU 
and the defence and security industry. Section 2 proceeds to discuss the notion of ‘dialogue’ as 
promoted by the European Commission and a set of conclusions for future developments is 
outlined in a final section. 
1.  Relations between the EU and the European security industry: An 
overview 
1.1  The emergence of EU security research 
Relations between the EU and the European defence and security industry date back to the early 
1990s, when the main industrial associations of European defence and aerospace industries 
opened offices in Brussels. For most of the decade, the main point of contention arose in the 
efforts of the European Commission to incorporate defence procurement markets into the 
framework of the Single Market, despite the opposition of member state governments. 
European security research initially emerged as a policy issue out of the armament markets. In a 
2003 Communication on “Towards an EU defence equipment policy”, the Commission changed 
its approach to the question by expanding the question of defence procurement to include the 
hazy notion of ‘global security’ (European Commission, 2003: 16). The reference was a clear 
attempt to join the bandwagon on the acceleration and transformation of European security 
policies following the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Within this perspective, the 
Commission offered in particular its ‘expertise for an initiative to promote cooperation on 
advanced research in the field of ‘global security’ (European Commission, 2003: 16). ‘Security 
research’ subsequently became the new label under which relations between the EU institutions 
and the European defence and security industries developed. While the Commission proceeded 
to establish a succession of high-level venues bringing together representatives from the public 
and private sector to discuss this matter (discussed below in section 1.2), defence and security 
industries re-engineered their pattern of engagement with the Brussels arenas, establishing two 
new professional associations in the process (see section 1.3). EU security research, on the other 
hand, materialised through two successive initiatives: the PASR and FP7-Security Theme 
(elaborated in section 1.4). 
1.2  High-profile venues in the field of security research 
In the period 2003-09, the European Commission established or supported three successive 
high-profile bodies on the issue of security research: the Group of Personalities on Security 
Research (GoP, 2003-04), the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB, 2005-06) 
and the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF, 2008-09). All three bodies 
brought together executives from major European defence and security companies (e.g. BAE 
Systems, Diehl, EADS, Ericsson, Thales, Sagem, Siemens), European officials from the 
Commission and the Council, representatives from a handful of established think tanks (e.g. the 
EU Institute for Security Studies, the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, the Istituto Affari 
Internazionali), and a number of officials from national and European security agencies and 
services (both police and military). 
Through their reports, the GoP and ESRAB have had a strong influence over the shaping of EU 
security-research schemes. The main proposal developed by the GoP report in this regard is the 
establishment of a European security research programme (ESRP) from 2007 onwards, relying 3 
in part on the experience, which was ongoing at the time, of the PASR. ESRAB’s final report 
takes on the same view, further singling out four main ‘mission areas’ of interest: 
•  Border security 
•  Protection against terrorism and organised crime 
•  Critical infrastructure protection 
•  Restoring security in case of crisis. 
The proposals of the GoP and ESRAB were largely taken up by the Commission in the crafting 
of the FP7’s Security Theme. 
A third venue, the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), was established 
in September 2007. While the Commission was not its initiator, it nonetheless strongly supports 
its creation in the abovementioned Communication on “Public-Private Dialogue”.1 Chaired by 
the former EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries, ESRIF is fairly similar to ESRAB 
in terms of constituency: a close-to-identical selection of representatives from larger corporate 
groups in the field of defence and security and research institutions, with a broader group of 
representatives from ministries of defence and interior and police forces (including non-EU 
countries such as Croatia, Switzerland or Turkey). ESRIF, incidentally, is also characterised by 
a stronger influence of member state governments and FP7 associated countries, which control 
the nominations to the forum. The objective of ESRIF, as stated by its chairman in the foreword 
to the forum’s interim report, is to “propose a European agenda for research and innovation in 
the field of security capable of guiding European institutions, governments and the private 
sector in the coming two decades” (ESRIF, 2008: 5). ESRIF is then essentially a foresight 
exercise to establish a roadmap for European security research beyond the 2013 deadline of 
FP7. 
1.3  Representation of the security industry in the European 
governmental arenas 
In recent years, the presence of the defence and security industries in Brussels has evolved from 
their original footholds established in the early 1990s, both in terms of organisation and 
orientation. One important step was taken with the creation of ASD (Aerospace and Defence 
Industries Association of Europe). Another recent development has been the constitution of the 
European Organisation for Security (EOS). EOS was established in July 2007, both to “support 
a consistent and comprehensive implementation of security strategies at national, European and 
international level” and to “support the development of a European security market”, by 
“developing a common understanding of security requirements” and “supporting the definition 
of sectoral solutions that are interoperable across applications and borders”.2 The membership of 
EOS is composed of major companies in the field of defence and security, of professional 
associations (most prominently, ASD) and to a lesser extent, of so-called ‘research 
organisations’ (e.g. TNO3), representatives of which staff the governing board of the 
organisation. 
Both ASD and EOS have been established with a clear angle: engaging with the European 
institutions, to support ‘European’ technological products in the field of defence and security, 
and the market thereof. The constituencies and governing boards of ASD and EOS are largely 
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similar - if one excludes the fact that the basic membership of ASD is composed of national 
associations instead of individual companies, while EOS membership is more of a mixed crowd. 
The EOS website, however, places strong emphasis on the fact that the organisation “addresses 
different domains of Security”, including “Green and Blue Border Surveillance, Security and 
Safety”, “Critical Infrastructure Protection” and “Civil Protection” – which incidentally 
correspond to the mission domains singled out by ESRAB in its final report, and currently 
explored by ESRIF. 
1.4  The security industry in European research schemes 
EU-funded security research has evolved into an important financial and political stake since 
2003. A first approach was initiated through the establishment the PASR (OJEU, 2004) which, 
over the period 2004-06, sponsored 39 actions and pilot projects in various domains of security 
research4 receiving a total Community contribution of €44.5 million. One-third of these projects 
were led by major defence and security companies (Thales, EADS, Finmeccanica, Sagem and 
their European association ASD), which overall participated in two-thirds of the PASR 
activities (Hayes, 2009: 12). Incidentally, most of these companies were also represented in the 
GoP and ESRAB. 
Following the recommendations of the GoP, the Commission established a major security 
research component within the Community’s FP7. Dubbed ‘Security Theme’, it accounts for 
about 4% of the FP7’s Cooperation Programme (CP).5 This figure, however, is somewhat 
misleading insofar as one can find security-related projects in other segments of the Cooperation 
Programme, such as Information and Communication Technologies (28% CP) Transport (12%) 
or Space (4%). The funds earmarked for the five years of the Security Theme nonetheless 
represent 30 times the amounts allotted for the three-year PASR. The European Commission has 
document 45 projects funded under the Security Theme so far (as of May 2009). Out of these, 
the organisations which were initially represented in the GoP total 32 individual participations, 
and have taken the lead on 7 projects.6 While not as obvious as for the PASR, these figures are 
indicative of a pattern in which major defence and security companies are contributing to the 
shaping of EU security and research policies on the one hand, and becoming important 
beneficiaries of these policies on the other. 
2.  Analysis: Questions about the ‘Public-Private Dialogue’ in EU 
security research and its implications 
The findings briefly presented so far raise important questions with regard the so-called ‘Public-
Private Dialogue’ advocated by the European Commission in its eponymous 2007 
Communication. The first question (2.1) that one feels compelled to ask in this respect is: 
dialogue between whom? Who are the ‘stakeholders’ that are actually (or supposed to be) 
involved? A second question (2.2) to be raised in this respect involves the objectives of such a 
‘dialogue’, and the adequacy between existing patterns of relations and these objectives. Here, 
we find in particular the issue of competitiveness, but also to some extent of transparency in the 
attribution of EU research funding.  
2.1  Dialogue between whom? 
The Commission’s 2007 Communication stipulates that ‘[d]eveloping an effective security 
research policy […] requires the implication of all relevant stakeholders’ (European 
                                                      
4 See Bigo & Jeandesboz, 2008, for an overview. 
5 Representing some €1,350 million out of a total of €32,365 million (see European Commission, 2007b, 
p.  4). 
6 Among them, Thales presents the most impressive record, participating in 10 projects and leading 3. 5 
Commission, 2007a). The document, however, remains mostly unclear as to who these 
‘stakeholders’ are supposed to be. It mentions several times the notion that these include the 
‘supply and demand’ sides of security research and technologies. It also points out ESRIF as the 
adequate venue for the envisaged Public-Private Dialogue to take place, by bringing together “a 
balanced representation of all stakeholders […] i.e. industry, research establishments, public and 
private end-users, civil society organisations, European institutions, in particular the European 
Parliament, and European organisations” (European Commission, 2007a: 10). 
An overview of the current membership of ESRIF, however, offers a sobering perspective on 
the actual shape of the ‘dialogue’ that this forum would be spearheading. Out of the 64 formal 
members of ESRIF, 34 are public officials, a majority of whom come from European or national 
security agencies and services, 16 represent corporate entities (including familiar names such as 
EADS, Finmeccanica, Thales, Sagem), 9 come from the academic sector and 5 from either 
public or private think tank structures. Due to overlapping responsibilities, five ESRIF members 
can be construed as representing ‘civil society’ (Hayes, 2009: 23). The ESRIF plenary, 
however, does not feature any representative from civil liberties or privacy organisations, nor 
representatives from the European Parliament. The same holds true for the 660 ‘stakeholders’, 
participating in the 11 working groups set up by ESRIF. According to the figures obtained by 
Statewatch researchers from the Commission, 66% (433) originate from the defence and 
security industry (with ASD, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales totalling 102 contributors by 
themselves), 30% (200) from the ‘demand side’ (national or European public sector), while only 
9 participants can be accounted for as ‘civil society’ (1.4%), none of which is actually part of a 
civil liberties or privacy organisation (Hayes, 2009: 24). 
The ‘dialogue’ foreseen by the European Commission and supposedly exemplified by ESRIF, is 
therefore currently a dialogue between the security and defence industry, particularly major 
transnational companies, and likely public sector customers. The absence of civil liberties and 
privacy organisations is probably the most striking aspect of ESRIF’s constituency. Another 
cause for concern is also the minority position occupied by representatives of academic bodies, 
which points to the confiscation of a whole facet of the European Research Area by private 
interests in accord with public authorities. This trend is all the more problematic as the 
objectives of a ‘dialogue’ in European security research remains unclear. 
2.2  Dialogue for what? 
The introduction of the Commission’s Public-Private Dialogue Communication specifies that 
“one of Europe’s main objectives is to preserve its values of open society and civil liberties 
while addressing the increased security threat. At the same time, Europe must secure its 
economy and its competitiveness…” (European Commission, 2007a: 2). The ‘dialogue’ 
envisaged by the communication is then geared towards a threefold objective: upholding values 
and fundamental liberties, guaranteeing security and preserving (and possibly enhancing) its 
competitiveness and economic growth. 
These three priorities, to say the least, have been rather unequally pursued in the context of EU 
security research. In its report, the GoP already indicated that such research should be 
“capability-driven”, i.e. dealing with questions such as “[w]hat are the threats?”, “[w]hat are the 
missions required to tackle these threats?”, “[w]hat are the capabilities needed to accomplish 
these missions?” and “[w]hat are the technologies – or combination of technologies – that can 
provide the necessary capabilities?” (GoP, 2004: 16). The ESRAB report advocates “research 
activities that aim at identifying, preventing, deterring, preparing and protecting against 
unlawful or intentional malicious acts harming European societies; human beings; organisations 
or structures, material and immaterial goods and infrastructures, including mitigation and 
operational continuity after such an attack (also applicable after natural/industrial disasters)” 
(ESRAB, 2006: 18).  6 
In the meantime, very little attention is dedicated to the question of fundamental freedoms and 
rights, and on the impact that new or improved technological ‘capabilities’ might have on those. 
When this is done, however, the dominant idea remains that freedom and security are equivalent 
values that should be ‘balanced’. The final report of the ESSTRT consortium,
7 one of the 
projects funded by the European Commission under the PASR, is illuminating in this respect. It 
notes that “[a]chieving the right balance between civil rights and security is challenging. A 
broad democratic debate on threats and responses offers the best guarantee that tougher security 
measures and enhanced powers conferred upon intelligence services and police forces have 
public consent” (ESSTRT, 2006: 20). It further specifies that “[a]nother factor to be taken into 
consideration is the relative efficiency of technologies. For example, facial recognition systems 
at present are very unreliable. The choice of technologies will become political and ethical if it 
is between efficient, but highly privacy-invasive systems and less efficient, but privacy-neutral 
solutions” (ESSTRT, 2006: 21. Emphasis added). While democratic debates on European 
security policies and their implications for the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals 
are certainly necessary, they are by no means sufficient, for some of the contemporary practices 
that are related to the technological management of insecurities fall beyond the scope of 
democratic investigation and scrutiny. Furthermore, the dominant viewpoint, as asserted in the 
ESSTRT report, frames the issue of privacy in terms of a choice between effective intrusiveness 
and non-intrusive inefficiency. The underlying assumption is that intrusiveness is a 
requirement for efficiency, and that privacy undermines efficiency (and thus enhances 
potential insecurities). Finally, the report favours the notion of ‘privacy-neutral’ prospects, 
over the possibility of ‘privacy-enhancing’ ones (which are however mentioned previously). 
Such a perspective by all means impoverishes the scope of discussions related to the ethical and 
political assumptions and the effects of security technologies. 
Part of the problem, here, lies in the fact that most of the projects funded by EU security 
research schemes are technical – i.e. focusing on engineering issues and technological 
development/demonstration. For instance, out of the 39 activities funded under the PASR, only 
two (ESSTRT and PRISE) take into consideration the broader legal, political and social 
implications of the reliance on security technologies (Bigo & Jeandesboz, 2008: 10). Within the 
45 documented projects of FP7-Security Theme, the INEX and DETECTER (Detection 
Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics and Human Rights) projects, and to a lesser extent the social 
science component of the GLOBE (Global Border Environment) project actually investigate the 
ethical, legal, political and social implications of the growing reliance on technical devices for 
security purposes. 
The objective of ensuring the “competitiveness of European industry in the security research 
area” (European Commission, 2007a: 7-8) should also be assessed critically. EU security 
research tends to be dominated by larger companies capable of a broad scope of activities and 
investments (EADS, Thales and Sagem being the most recurrent), while small and medium 
companies (SMEs) are almost invisible – although at least one PASR activity (SecureSME, 
third call) deals with their involvement in EU research and development schemes. Furthermore, 
the involvement of major companies both in the policy process of establishing EU security 
research schemes and as applicants for funding through these schemes, appears highly 
problematic insofar as the fairness and transparency of the application process is concerned. 
Finally, this involvement appears to be self-sustaining. Most of the corporate participants in the 
GoP were involved in ESRAB, and in turn in ESRIF. Within the FP7-Security Theme, the 
CRESCENDO project (Coordination action on Risks, Evolution of threats and context 
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assessment by an enlarged network for an R&D roadmap) is the follow-up to two PASR 
activities (SeNTRE and STACCATO) and aims at furthering and expanding the public/private, 
expert/stakeholder network already established in previous schemes. These elements raise a 
number of issues – not the least being the actual desirability to foster or support ‘European 
champions’ in a domain that used to be the turf of ‘national champions’ in view of the EU’s 
competition policy, or of the objective of supporting a strong industrial basis in a way that 
would be detrimental to SMEs. 
3. Recommendations 
As we have seen, the lack of reflexivity and the path dependency that characterise established 
relations between the industry and member states’ ministries of defence, has been extended to 
the ministries of interior through the involvement of DG Enterprise. In the meantime, it has 
excluded or relegated to mere ‘addenda’ the bodies, groups and organisations working on such 
related questions as policing accountability, surveillance, civil liberties in relation to security 
and human rights. This orientation, which has been embraced since the very beginning, has 
forced these groupings to set up, often without financial backup of any kind, their own networks 
– which have been composed more of NGOs and academics than companies. In this respect, one 
can question the internal choice of the European Commission to put DG Enterprise in charge of 
the EU’s activities in the field of security research and development – a choice that has resulted 
in an unbalanced and narrowed down understanding of security issues in these research 
schemes. It is important to recall, in this perspective, that legal questions related to freedom and 
human rights are, and should be, key elements for any research on security technologies. At the 
moment, beyond the occasional exception, these issues have mostly been relegated to the 
devising of ‘codes of conduct’ for ethical research. The entanglement of internal and external 
security concerns implies new relations involving a growing number of actors. Any effort to 
achieve ‘global security’, or even an ‘area of security’ as in the case of the EU, through 
technology involves, beyond defence and border interdiction, issues related to intelligence, 
policing, border crossing, justice, data protection, citizenship, the rights of foreigners, ethics, 
and the questions of freedom of movement and presumption of innocence – particularly in a 
context where pre-crime strategies and prevention through sophisticated technologies are given 
priority. 
It is therefore central to see that the EU Ombudsman and his network, the European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Art. 29 Group, as well as 
the LIBE and Human Rights Committees of the European Parliament are granted the possibility 
to offer significant research funding on the issues of security, privacy and freedom.  
Secondly, these bodies should be entitled to examine and assess the findings of other research 
schemes financed by the EU to see if they are in compliance with their objectives. Finally, they 
should be involved extensively in the framing of calls for proposals. 
Before a full reorganisation is launched (in preparation for the upcoming 8
th Framework 
Programme), a transition initiative should be undertaken, to promote in particular a better 
awareness on the part of DG Enterprise of the broader implications of security research. This 
could alternatively take the form of a specific social science call on security, freedom, human 
rights and privacy, or of the creation of a network of experts chosen in equal parts by the main 
protagonists, whose mission would be to envisage alternative framings to these questions – 
emphasising, beyond the link between technology as an alleged ‘requirement’ for security, the 
entanglement of freedom and security as two sides of the same coin. 8 
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